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Beginner
The AI Agent Threat Model
What actually breaks when an LLM can act: injection, the lethal trifecta, and OWASP ASI01-10.
By the end of this track
You’ll be able to audit any agent design against the lethal trifecta and OWASP ASI01–10, and name the control that answers each risk.
14 lessons~31 min42 questions
Start → Why agents break classic security assumptions- 1Why agents break classic security assumptionsSee exactly which assumptions traditional application security relies on, and which ones a language model violates.2 min
- 2Prompt injection, direct and indirectDistinguish the user-supplied attack from the far more dangerous one that arrives inside content the agent reads.2 min
- 3Lab: defeat your own defensesLabBuild the two defenses everyone reaches for first, break both in a few characters, and see exactly why the fix is not at the prompt layer.4 min
- 4The lethal trifectaUse Simon Willison's three-capability model to decide whether a given agent configuration is exploitable at all.2 min
- 5Lab: send data out without calling anythingLabEmit one line of markdown and trace what the client does with it.2 min
- 6OWASP Top 10 for Agentic ApplicationsWalk the ASI01-ASI10 categories so you have a shared vocabulary for agent risk.2 min
- 7The context window as an exfiltration surfaceTreat everything the model can see as already disclosed, and design credential handling around that.2 min
- 8Lab: a secret you pasted 37 turns agoLabPut a credential into a conversation, run it forward, and check whether it is still reachable at the end.2 min
- 9Excessive agency and the confused deputyUnderstand why an agent's privileges, not its intentions, determine how bad an attack gets.2 min
- 10Memory poisoning, multi-agent risk, and supply chainFollow the attacks that persist across sessions and spread between agents.2 min
- 11Lab: plant something in session one, collect in session twoLabWrite to agent memory as an attacker, then open a clean session as a different user and watch it arrive.2 min
- 12Designing the defense: the control plane patternAssemble the whole track into an architecture, and see the shape 1Claw implements.2 min
- 13Lab: audit real agents in the wildLabFetch 1Claw's live, public agent directory and run the trifecta audit method from this track against whatever is actually registered right now.3 min
- 14Capstone: audit an agent fleetCapstoneApply the whole track to three real agents: find the exploitable one, rank the risk, and say what you would change first.2 min